Santa Clara Law Review
Volume 3 | Number 1

Article 8

1-1-1962

Recent Decisions
Santa Clara Law Review

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Santa Clara Law Review, Case Note, Recent Decisions, 3 Santa Clara Lawyer 104 (1962).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/lawreview/vol3/iss1/8

This Case Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Santa Clara Law Review by an authorized administrator of Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
sculawlibrarian@gmail.com.

Recent Decisions
COMMUNITY PROPERTY: ALLOCATION OF PROFITS OF HUSBAND'S SEPARATE
PROPERTY ENTERPRISES: Estate of Neilson, 57 Cal.2d 733, 371 P.2d 745, 22
Cal.Rptr. 1 (1962)
The appellant does not dispute the proposition that, if Pepper had, year after
year, sown his land to grain, the resulting crops would have formed a part
of his separate estate.'
The above concession was a decisive factor in the much criticized decision
of the supreme court in Estate of Pepper. In Pepper, feeling that the proceeds
of an agricultural enterprise could not be accurately apportioned, the court
ruled that the proceeds of such labor by a husband on his own separate property
would be part of his separate estate. This exception to the rule of apportionment
of income from the labors of a husband on his separate property has been
formally eliminated by the recent ruling in Estate of Neilson.2
The litigation in the Neilson case arose out of a probate matter involving
several plots of agricultural property. The original controversy concerned the
ascertainment of the amount of the community property. The matter came
before the supreme court after the trial court had rejected the following jury
instruction.
If the income and profits of separate property of a husband can be accurately
identified and segregated, they would be his separate property and not community property. Thus the income and earnings from the farming operations
of a husband conducted by him upon his separate real property constitute
his separate property, and are not community property even though he has
devoted his personal skill and attention to the cultivation and care of such
8
property.
The supreme court affirmed the decision of the trial court which had held
that the ruling in Pepper was no longer effective. Speaking of Pereirav. Pereira4
and subsequent cases, the court stated:
These cases have established the rule that when part of the proceeds from
a separate enterprise or investment arise from the husband's efforts, there
must be an apportionment. Estate of Pepper . . . is therefore overruled. 5

The court reasoned that the mere fact that the profits from an agricultural
enterprise could not be apportioned with mathematical certainty in no way
meant that apportionment was impossible or improper. Thus the rule of apportionment has now been made uniform in California, and any income derived by
' Estate of Pepper, 158 Cal. 619, 623, 112 Pac. 62, 64 (1910).
257 Cal.2d 733, 371 P.2d 745, 22 Cal.Rptr. 1 (1962).
8 Id. at 738, 371 P.2d at 748, 22 Cal.Rptr. at 4.
'156 Cal. 1, 103 Pac. 488 (1909).
5 Estate of Neilson, 57 Cal.2d 733, 741, 371 P.2d 745, 749, 22 Cal.Rptr. 1, 5 (1962).
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a husband from labor on his separate property regardless of the nature of such
property must now be apportioned.
Anthony B. Varni

TORTS: GUEST STATUTES: PASSENGER FOR COMPENSATION: Tucker v. Landucci,
57 Cal.2d 762, 371 P.2d 754, 22 Cal.Rptr. 10 (1962).
Litigation in the area of passenger and guest recoveries for the negligent
operation of an automobile has been numerous. The recent ruling in Tucker v.
Landucci' seems to have liberalized and possibly expanded the test as to who
is a passenger for compensation. The effect of this change has been to extremely
limit the definition of a "guest."
The test as to who falls into the classification of a guest for compensation
2
is basically that found in McCann v. Hoffman. As stated in that case, the guide
lines are as follows.
[W]here a special tangible benefit to the Defendant was the motivating
influence for furnishing the transportation, compensation may be said to
have been given. .

.

. [W]here the relationship between the parties is one

of business and the transportation is supplied in the pursuit thereof for their
has been given and the Plaintiff is a passenger
mutual benefit, compensation
3
and not a guest.

In Tucker v. Landucci the supreme court, using the above guide posts, ruled
that the fact situation there involved justified a jury determination that the
plaintiff was a passenger for compensation.
Plaintiff was a rider in the car which defendant owned and was driving
when the accident occurred which gave rise to this case. The defendant,
Landucci, a saleslady in the junior wear department of a dry goods store, asked
the head buyer of her department, Mrs. Castle, to join her for dinner. Mrs.
Castle, in the course of the day, invited the plaintiff, an assistant buyer in the
ladies wear department, and Mrs. Abbot, the chief buyer of that department,
to join her and the defendant for cocktails after work. The purpose of the
Saturday gathering was to celebrate the birthdays of Mrs. Abbott and the
plaintiff.
Later, at the cocktail lounge, a discussion arose concerning a future fashion
show of which Mrs. Castle was in charge and in which the plaintiff was to
perform extensive duties. While still in the lounge, Mrs. Castle suggested that
the plaintiff join the defendant and herself for dinner in order to allow the
three of them to continue their discussion of the show, which was to be held the
following Monday. The defendant's part in the show was to help with the
models, as all salesladies were expected to do. By coming to dinner the plaintiff

157 Cal.2d 762, 371 P.2d 754, 22 Cal.Rptr. 10 (1962).
29

Cal.2d 279, 70 P.2d 909 (1937).

-1Id. at 286, 70 P.2d at 913.
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and Mrs. Castle could finish their discussion and avoid a proposed Sunday
meeting. On the way to dinner, the automobile in which the three women
were riding was involved in a collision caused by the negligence of the defendant.
The supreme court ruled that this situation plainly met the test of "motivating influence," "tangible benefit," and the other requirements outlined in
McCann. It found that the relationship between the parties was primarily one
of business, that the defendant as well as the plaintiff benefited from the meeting, and that the primary purpose of inviting Mrs. Castle was for business rather
than social reasons.
The aspect of this decision which tends to broaden the McCann test is the
fact that the defendant was compensated, but not by the plaintiff. The plaintiff
and defendant were both employees, but in different departments; the plaintiff
was in no position to benefit the defendant in her employment. In McCann,
on the other hand, the relationship between the parties was that of employer
and employee. Any benefits derived by the defendant in this case, however, by
establishing a closer relationship with influential members of the firm or securing
inside information regarding latest fashions was compensation derived from
Mrs. Castle. Furthermore, the plaintiff rather than the defendant appeared to
have benefitted from the cocktail lounge gathering, since she was able to avoid
the proposed Sunday meeting.
Apparently the test as to what constitutes compensation has thus been
expanded to the point where a mere business relationship between the parties
is sufficient; and such a relationship exists where the parties are merely fellow
employees. Therefore it would seem to follow that where the parties are related
in a business connection and one of the riders in the automobile affords some
compensation to the driver, all the riders have the status of passengers.
Anthony B. Varni

